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Ammonia is present in agrilture and commerce in manyif not most communities. This report
evaluates the toxic potency ofammonia, based on three ypes ofdata: anecdotal data, in some
cas predating World War I, recnstructons of contemporary industrid acdents, and animal
bioassays. Standards andguidelines for human exposure have been drivenlargelybytheanecdotal
data, suggesting that ammonia at 5,000-10,000 parts per million, volume/volume (ppm-v),
might be lethal within 5-10 mi. However, contemporary accident reconstructions suggest that
ammonia lethality requires higher concentrations. For example, 33,737 ppm-vwas a 5-min zero-
mortality value in a major ammonia release in 1973 in South Africa. Comparisons ofsecondary
reports of ammonia lethality with original sources revealed discrepancies in contemporary
sources, apparenty resulting from failure to examine old documents or accuately translate for-
eign documents. The present invmestigation revealed that contemporary dent reconstrucions
yield ammonialethalityleves comparable to those indozens ofreports ofanimal bioassays, after
adjustment of concentrations to human equivalent concentrations via U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) procedures. Ammonia levels potentially caus iersibl injury or
impairing the abilityofexposedpeople to escape fromfiurherexposure or from coincidentperils
similarly have been biased do dly incontemporary sources. The EPA has identified ammo-
niaas one of366 extremelyhazardous substances subject to commiyright-to-know provisions
oftheSuperfundAct andemergencyphanningprovisions ofthe CeanAirAct The CleanAirAct
defines emergency plnning zones (EPZ) around indul facilities exeing a threshold quan-
tity of ammonia on-site. This study suggests that EPZ areas around ammonia facilities can be
reduced, thereby also reducing emergencyplanning costs which willvary roughlywith the EPZ
radius squared. Key work airpoliutant, ammonia, emer y nning health risk assessment,
human health, inhalation, respiratory irritant. Environ Heakh Perspec 107:617-627 (1999).
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In 1984 methyl isocyanate was released from
achemical plant in Bhopal, India. The release
reportedly killed thousands of residents and
irreversibly injured the eyes and lungs of
approximately 20,000 (1). Internationally,
governments recognized the need to identify
extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) and
assist communities in preparing for chemical
emergencies. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) identified 366
EHSs, as required by the Community Right-
To-Know Act (2). Community emergency
planning requirements followed under the
Risk Management Program (RMP) in
Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments (3).
Industrial facilities exceeding threshold
quantities ofEHSs on site are subject to the
RMP. The RMP defines emergencyplanning
zones (EPZs) around facilities, and requires
facilities to submit to the EPA a risk manage-
ment plan aimed at preventing catastrophic
chemical releases and averting Bhopal-type
consequences of releases. The cost of com-
munity emergency planning for a facility is
likely to roughly depend on the area of its
EPZ, which in turn depends on the square of
the radius around the facility deemed neces-
sary to attenuate aworst-case chemical release
to specified airborne concentrations, termed
acute exposure guideline levels (AEGLs).
The AEGLs for each EHS have nothing
to do with routinely acceptable exposures.
Acceptable community and occupational
levels are set by a host of more conservative
parameters. Rather, the AEGLs must be
established to protect members ofthe gener-
al population in the context of "exposure at
high levels but ofshort duration, usually less
than one hour, and only once in a lifetime"
(1). The AEGIs are under development by
the National Advisory Committee (NAC)
on AEGIs. NAC AEGL composition is leg-
islatively defined to assure balance, although
NAC AEGL deliberations about ammonia
began before the committee reached its full
complement. Ammonia was one of the first
EHSs to be addressed by NAC AEGL, and
is of great concern both to companies and
communities (4):
During the 20th century, humanity has almost
quadrupled its numbers. Although many factors
have fostered this unprecedented expansion, its
continuation during the past generation would
not have been at all possible without a wide-
spread-yet generally unappreciated-activity:
the synthesis ofammonia.
Three types ofAEGLs are defined by the
National Research Council (1): AEGL-1, to
protect against nuisance exposure; AEGL-2,
to protect against irreversible injury or dis-
ability (including impairment of the ability
to escape); and AEGL-3, to protect against
lethality. Each type ofAEGL is quantified
via multiple combinations of airborne con-
centration and exposure duration (5 min, 30
min, 1 hr, 4 hr, and 8 hr) to protect against
effects of concern in exposures lasting from
minutes to hours.
This assessment of the acute toxicologic
potency ofammonia critically evaluates avail-
able toxicologic and accident reconstruction
data, updating air dispersion modeling results
to quantify concentrations to which victims
probably were exposed more accurately than
older models could. This investigation
assumes that gaseous anhydrous ammonia is
released in the vicinity ofemployees wearing
no protective breathing apparatus, or that
unprotected members of the general public
encounter it. Chemical risks posed by ammo-
nium, ammonium salts, and liquid ammonia
are excluded from consideration. Also, cryo-
genic, high-pressure, and high temperature
risks areexcluded.
Methods
Standard procedures of technical informa-
tion acquisition were used. These included
online and in-house database and literature
searches and the acquisition ofselected doc-
uments. Specific information about the
Potchefstroom, South Africa, ammonia
release was provided by ERM-Four
Elements (Columbus, OH), and apparently
represents the same information as that pub-
lished by Lonsdale (5) and Pederson and
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Selig (6). Acceptance criteria for input data
for the present assessment were adopted, and
artides were examined to identifytoxicologic
information conforming with these criteria.
To be accepted for quan-titative analysis,
studies must have identified the test species
and reported acute toxic inhalation effect(s)
and exposure regimens, induding concentra-
tion(s) in air and duration(s) of exposure.
Concentrations to which animals were
exposed in bioassays were adjusted to human
equivalent concentrations (HECs) using
parameters for dose conversion among
species (7,8) and standard EPAmethodology
for irritant gases (8).
Results
Odor and OdorThreshold
The odor of ammonia is distinct, pungent,
and often familiar because of its common
use in deaning. Several reports of the odor
threshold for airborne ammonia have been
published. These indude values of 25 parts
per million, volume/volume (ppm-v) (9,10),
48 ppm-v (10,11), 46.8 ppm-v (12,13), and
0.0266-39.6 mg/m3 (0.04-57 ppm-v)
(13,14). The presence ofairborne ammonia
may become apparent to exposed individuals
at concentrations-in air roughly in the range
ofoccupational exposure limits.
VaporDensity
The molecular weight ofammonia (NH3) is
17.03 d (g/mol) (10,15-14). Its vapor densi-
ty is 0.6 relative to air, which is assigned a
reference vapor density of unity (= 1)
(13,17). The density ofliquid ammonia at
one atmosphere pressure (and -33.35° C) is
0.6818 (15). The density of mixtures of
ammonia with water (ammonia water)
depends on the ammonia fraction. The den-
sity is 0.957 for a 10% ammonia solution
and 0.90 for a Spirit ofHartshorn solution,
which is 28-29% ammonia.
AcuteToxic Inhalation Effects
Reversible or clinically insignifcant effects.
Several reports of reversible or clinically
insignificant effects exerted by ammonia on
humans were located (Table 1). These effects
include eye irritation (10,13,18-20), upper
airway irritation (10,13,18-20), lacrimation
(10,13,18-20), altered breathing patterns
(10,19), minor biochemical changes (13,21),
and minor blood pressure and pulse rate
changes (10,19). Similar effects were also
reported in animal studies. The lowest expo-
sure concentration eliciting effects was 50
ppm-v over a duration of 10 min, causing
faint to moderate irritation of the human
upperairway (13,18).
Irrevenibkinjury..animalstdies. Several
reports of potentially irreversible nonlethal
dinical effects involvingbioassayanimalswere
located. Bioassay animals exhibiting such
effects included mice (10,12,25-27), rats
(10,13,28), rabbits (10,13,18,22,27,29), and
cats (13,18,27,29).
Irreversible injury: human studies.
Examination ofTable 1 reveals no reports
of potentially irreversible nonlethal clinical
effects in humans. Accident reports reveal
two accidents involving permanent injuies,
including impaired breathing and damage
to the respiratory system, throat, and eyes
(30). However, the estimated ammoniacon-
centration range is unhelpfully broad
(700-10,000 ppm-v) and exposure dura-
tions are unstated.
Fatal exposure: animal studies. Studies
of ammonia-induced mortality in animal
bioassays are set forth in Table 2. A 1-hr
median lethal concentration (LC50) value for
cats exposed to airborne ammoniawas 1,071
ppm-v (31,32). Numerous bioassay reports
are analyzed in Table 2, giving equivalent
5-, 30-, and 60-min human inhalation low-
est lethal concentration (LCLO) and LC50
values in accordance with the equation CQ
(t) = constant, using n = 1 (Haber's rule)
and n= 2 (33).
Fatal exposure: human studies.
Examination of Table 1 reveals several
reports ofhuman mortality following expo-
sure to airborne ammonia at a concentration
of5,000 ppm-v. Concentrations are typical-
ly estimates obtained from accident recon-
structions. One report indicates immediate
death from spasm, inflammation, or edema
ofthe larynx (13,34). Other reports indicate
exposure durations of 5 min (27,35,36) or
30 min (10,37). A different lethality bench-
mark-7,000 ppm-v over 3 hr exposure-
was reported in a draft Environment Canada
document (13,38). Selected reports of
human lethality were examined to distin-
guish between primary research or clinical
reports versus secondary reviews. The evolu-
tion of reported lethality benchmark values
is traced over time in Figure 1.
Environment Canada (38). The 1981
draft is out ofprint, superseded by a July
1984 final report. The 5,000-ppm-v lethality
concentration remains. The Environment
Canada (38) document source is the 1978
edition of the Encyclopedia ofChemical
Technology (39), specdficallya table referred to
byEnvironment Canada (38) as a "Summary
of Human Exposure." In the Kirk-Othmer
table (39), 5,000 ppm-v (7,179 mg/m3) is
associated with "serious edema, strangulation,
asphyxia; fat almostimmediately."
Environment Canada (38) also provides
Table 7.4.1 "Inhalation," in which literature
on effects and effect concentrations is cited.
The Kirk-Othmer (39) citation and effect
concentration are not used. However,
ammonia is associated with (apparently
lethal) "respiratory spasm and rapid asphyx-
ia" in a range of 3,500-7,000 mg/m3
(approximately 2,500-5,000 ppm-v) by
Braker and Mossman (40). The same range
is cited in a National Research Council
report (41), which also indicates a 0.5- to 1-
hr exposure duration. The Environment
Canada table (38) cites a Registry ofToxic
Effects of Chemical Substances (RTECS)
report (27) of a 5-min LCLO of 21,000
mg/m3 (approximately 30,000 ppm-v).
Table 7.4.1 also cites a 3-hr LCLO of7,000
pg/m3 (approximately 10,000 ppm-v)
reported by the International Technical
Information Institute (ITII) (42.
The Environment Canada report (38) is a
secondary source; the source quality is low.
[See Kirk-Othmer (39), Brakerand Mossman
(40), ITII (42), andRTECS (27).]
Kirk-Othmer (39). Table 13 indicates
that 5,000 ppm-v ammonia is associated
with the notation: "seriousedema, strangula-
tion, asphyxia; fatal almost immediately"
(39). The cited source ofthis information is
BrakerandMossman (43).
This is a secondary source; the source
quality islow. SeeBrakerand Mossman (43).
Braker and Mossman (40,43). For sum-
mary purposes the sixth edition was obtained.
Table 1 sets forth vapor concentrations, gen-
eral effects, and exposure periods. Ammonia
at 5,000-10,000 ppm-v is associated with
"respiratory spasm, rapid asphyxia," and the
exposure period indicates "rapidly fatal" (40).
Noprimarysourcecitations areprovided.
This is a secondary source; the source
qualityislow. The exposureperiod is unquan-
tified. No primary source citation is provided.
Thisreportshouldberejectedinfavorofmore
completelydocumentedreports.
ITII (42). A lethal inhalation concentra-
tion of 10,000 ppm-v at exposure duration
3 hr is given. No primary source citation
isprovided.
This is a secondary source; the source
quality is low. This report should be rejected
in favor of more completely documented
reports.
Henderson and Haggard (37). This
monograph is a secondary source (a review),
and does not constitute a primary report of
dinical or experimental findings. It indudes a
table titled "Physiological Responses to
Various Concentrations ofAmmonia." The
table indudes an entryindicatingthat ammo-
nia is "rapidlyfatal forshort exposure" (37) at
concentrations of 5,000-10,000 ppm-v. The
primary source ctation is apparently the pre-
vious-line citation [Ronzani (44)], and the
phrase "short exposure" refers to 1/2 hr or
1/2-1 hr. The table also indicates that the
maximum concentration allowable for short
exposure (1/2-1 hr) is 300-500 ppm-v
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Table 1.Inhalation effects exertedbyammonia in studiesinvolving humans.
Exposure Dosetmes
duration duraton Study Primary Secondary
Concentraton in air(ppm) (min) (ppm-v/min) type Reportedeffecdts) referencea referenceb
Acuteexposures(within24hr)
46.8 - - - Sensory:odorthreshold (12)
5 359 NOAEL Ocular eyeirritationwith lacrimation (1 1
135 5 675 T OcularWe irritation withlacrimation (13)
135 5 675 TC Respiratory: chestirritation(1 of6) (19(
50 120 6,000 LOAEL Ocular eyemaiton (20 (10
minuevolume,cyclicpatternofhyperpnea
500 30 15,000 NOAEL Cardiovascular increasedbloodpressureandpulserate (19( (1t) -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -r - q.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ____ __- ,..., - - IWCHSi -Wi,.
700 - - - Ocular eyeirmtation,permanentinjuryinabsenceof (34) (13)
promptremedial measures
orademaofthelarynx
5,000 55 25,000 LCw Lethality:specific causeofdeath notreported ( (2'
810 240 194,400 Casereport Biochemistry: somebiochemicaleffects(21)
Offi hWE*P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 94 w
5,000 eth- - Leaty Lethality:fata almostimmediately (3 (43)
10,000 180 1,800,000 Letlity Lethalitr othereffects not reported (42) (3
30,000 5 150,000 Le"ikyi butrep valueiserroneous(seeted) (4b (47)
Apparentlylongertermstudy
4 ~4'J A+
_r.:
-r
20 ?_ T Ocular:conjunctive irtation (72 (3Aq
Abbreviations: ?,exposure durationunquantified;LCLO, lowest lethal concentration; LOAEL, lowestadverse effectlevel; NOAEL, no adverse effectlevel; TQ0,lowesttoxic concentration.
"Original research orstated conclusion. bSource of additional information aboutprimarysource(s).
TableL Human exposures toairborne ammoniapredictedto belethal, based on human and animal data.
Haber'srule[CO {( = constant; n= 11 Ten Bergeadjustment(n=2)
Statistic Unit Parameter 5min 30min 60min 5min 30 min 0 min
Humanlethality, based onhumanstudies
Minimum ppm IC 5,000 833 417 5,000 2,041 1,443
Arithmeti mean ppmn 95,000 15,833 7,917 20000 8,165 5.774
Coefficient ofvariaton - IC10 103 103 103 61 61 61 I~~~flMIIIIhIhmEEMhEimmm1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1l~~~~' ~~ ~~~ ~~ .Y n:b:. ....... .......... gi ..
W
Numberofreportedlethalityvalues (nr - E 5 5 5 5 5 5 '0ri~~~~~~~~~~
77 ---
Geometricmeanc ppm IC0 230,923 38,487 19,244 38,287 15,631 11,053
SDO ppm IC19 158,937 26,490 13,245 16,969 6,928 4,899
~~~~~~~~~.. .... .................................................. k!. . 0%M 6 S ;u j
Numberofreportedlethalityvalues(n)r - LC or LC 34 34 34 34 34 34
j61 7', p'i $7'. <- ¶t ,r -~~~!
Geometric meanc ppm I orIC 108,478 19,369 9,946 34,455 14,559 10,433 __ _
-D8 4tppm I orLC 126,400 21,067 10,533 44,827 18,300 12,940
Abbreviations: LCW, median lethal concentration;LCLO, lowest lethal concentration; SD, standard deviation.
'Reported lethality values may appear in multiple references, and some references may report more than one ofthe tabulated lethalityvalues.Thus,the number ofreported lethalityval-
ues differs from the number of reference citations. References are human LCL based on human studies(34,36-39,42,43,46,47A; human LCLOorLCs, based on animal studies: cat(29,38);
mouse (26,33,38,74-79); rabbit(29,38); and rat (23,24,28,31,33,38,63,71,73,76,77).A%inimum: lowestamong nvalues. 'Geometric mean = nth root ofthe product of nvalues = sum of loga-
rithms of nvalues, divided by n. dArithmetic mean: sum of nvalues, divided by n. 'SD = square root ofthe variance,wherethe variance = sum of nsquared deviationsfrom the arithmetic
mean, divided by(n - 1).tCoefficientofvariation = 100 xSD/arithmetic mean.
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[Ronzani (44) and Lehmann (45)]; and that
2,500-4,500 ppm-v is dangerous for even
short exposure (1/2 hr) (44).
This is a secondary source; the source
quality is old but acceptable; more recent and
better documented sources would be prefer-
able. The phrase "short exposure" associated
with lethality can refer to 1/2 hr or 1/2-1 hr,
but seems to have been erroneously interpret-
ed as meaning 5-10 min in derivative con-
temporary sources (Figure 1).
Maass (35,36). The German words
for ammonia are Ammoniak (gas) and
Salmiakgeist (solution). Maass (35) primarily
introduced principles ofbiology and toxicolo-
gy of chemical agents used in warfare.
However, ammonia appears to be unmen-
tioned, and its citation in the RTECS report
(27) is erroneous. Maass (36) presented a
table titled "Approximate Effectiveness of
Gases and Vapors for Humans" [translated
title] lists Ammoniak. Ammonia is listed as
lethal at 5,000 ppm-v following exposure
of 5-10 min duration. No primary source
citation is provided for this entry. General
literature is provided in an appendix on pages
249-250. However, the appendix presumably
pertains to previously presented information,
not to subsequent tables, some ofwhich also
have appended material. Finally, the literature
cited appears to be ofageneral nature, includ-
ing no primary research reports likely to be
the original source ofanytoxicologic data.
These are secondary sources; the source
quality is low. The lethal value-5,000 ppm-
v over 10 min-lacks primary documentary
support. The translated source table (36) title
emphasizes that the tabulated values are
approximate, suggesting that a definitive
measurement may have been unavailable.
These old reports together fail to meet cur-
rent standards oftechnical documentation.
U.S. Coast Guard (34). The January
1991 edition contains a material safety data
sheet for anhydrous ammonia that does not
cite a lethal vapor concentration.
This is a secondary source; the source
quality is low. This report should be rejected
in favor of more completely documented
source(s). If the 1984-1985 edition (34)
included a lethal vapor concentration, that
parameter or its value in the case of anhy-
drous ammonia was abandoned in the later
edition. This document should be rejected.
Sax and Lewis (46). This document lists
human 5-min inhalation LC 30,000
ppm-v.
This is a secondary source; the source
quality is low because of erroneous informa-
tion. This document should be rejected in
favor of more accurate source(s). See cited
reference [Mulder and Van derZalrim (4iA].
Mulder and Van Der Zalm (47). A per-
son filling a tank wagon with 25% ammonia
solution failed to wear respiratory protection,
and died. The report (translated from Dutch)
fails to quantify the exposure duration. It is
imprecise about ammonia concentrations in
the breathing-zone air ofthe deceased, whose
face had been reddened (47):
Layer oflung below the superficial layer had been
harmed....He had inhaled great amount of con-
centrated ammoniia....At the moment of the
mishap, the ammonia water soltition spread as a
thin film over the tank car. The wind direction
Figure 1. Evolution of four human lethality values for inhalation of ammonia. Abbreviations: ATSDR, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; HSDB,
Hazardous Substances Data Bank; ITII, International Technical Information Institute; RTECS, Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances. Solid lines indi-
cate sources that are explicitly cited. Dashed lines indicate sources that are apparent but uncited.
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was toward the victim. The vapor pressure ofa 25-
percent (byweight) ammonia solution is 224 mm
of mercury. As a consequence of that, the vapor
contained 33-percent ammonia (by volume), or
330,000 ppm. Of course, under these circum-
stances, there was not asaturated vapor pressure at
the level ofthevictim. The actual concentration of
ammonia is unknown, but is roughly estimated to
be multiple times 10,000 ppm.
The deceased had been instructed to
report to the first aid room formedical atten-
tion, but instead went to the coffee room for
milk. He then worked 3 hr. First aid was
sought only 3 hr after the exposure incident,
whereupon the patient was transferred to a
clinic to have X rays performed. His heart
stopped, but was restarted; he was transferred
to a hospital, where his heart stopped again.
The immediate cause of death, which
occurred 6 hr postexposure, was heart failure,
although the pathology report indicated that
the underlying cause was the effect of ammo-
nia on the deep layer ofthe lung, presumably
creating cardiopulmonary stress that proved
intolerable over the protracted period of
perhaps 3-6 hr between exposure and initia-
tion ofmedical attention.
This document is a primary source; the
source quality is imprecise but acceptable
and important. Sax and Lewis (46) incor-
rectly list a 5-min LCLO of 30,000 ppm-v
based on this source. The incorrect value
persists in the latest edition (48). This acci-
dent is further evaluated below.
Accident reports. Numerous articles
report lethality of anhydrous ammonia
releases [e.g., (5,6,30,47,49-59)]. One of
these cited reports (47) was mentioned
above. However, reliable measurements of
concentrations and durations of exposure are
lacking. The absence ofsuch data has moti-
vated attempts to reconstruct ambient con-
centrations during accidents retrospectively,
for example, based on air dispersion model-
ing (6,30,52,53) or evidence from ammonia-
induced damage to biota (30).
Dutch accident. In the Dutch accident
mentioned above (47), a tank was being
refilled with 25% ammonia at an external
temperature of 10C over an unquantified
period. Although Mulder and Van der Zalm
(47) expressed the belief that the air at the
level of the victim had not reached satura-
tion (330,000 ppm-v), presumably the
atmosphere within the tank was saturated.
The ammonia-saturated vapor must have
been displaced into the ambient air in close
proximity to the deceased while he was on
top ofthe tank to fill it. In addition, ammo-
nia vapor, lighter than air at 100C, would
have been rising from the rich pool of
ammonia from overflowed ammonia solu-
tion on the ground. Thus, the deceased, who
"inhaled a great amount of concentrated
ammonia" (47), appears to have been
exposed, at least sporadically, to two sources
ofammonia vapor at all or a reasonably high
fraction of the 330,000-ppm-v saturated
vapor concentration during the filling and
measuring operation.
Given the time between exposure and
death, Mulder and Van der Zalm (47) sug-
gested that airborne ammonia concentrations
equal to a reasonably large fraction of
330,000 ppm-v are not rapidly fatal. This is
Table3 Synthesisofaccidentreportstodiscern ammonia effectlevels.'
Estimated
concentration Geometric Release Exposure
From To mean duration duration Exposed Affected
Category/location Date (ppm) (ppm) (ppm) (min) (min) (no.) (no.) Effect
Humanfatality
Boutte,LA 15Dec70 5,000 200,000 31:623 3 - F3tal
Potchefstroom, SouthAfrica 13Jul73 5,000 200.000 31,623 Instant - - 10 atal
'"5E';l*3 ibB
Pensacola, FL 9Nov77 20,000 200,000 63,246 240 - - 2 Fatal
Bamesvlle, MN 10Jun81 700 10,000 2,646 30 - - 11 Injury:claimed permanent torespiratorysystemr
4 jg w -
Houston,TX 11 May76 700 10,000 2:646 Instant - - 3 Injury:permanentbreathing impairment
LWutte,IA 15Dec70 300 5,000 1,225 3 - - 3 lnjury:treated,released<24hr
Cod6nway, KS -6Dec73 300 5,000 1,225 <480 - - 1 Injury:hospitalized6days:eye, nose,throat, lung
Boutte, LA ~15Dec70 700 10.000 2,646 3 - - 26 Injury: hospitalized <14days; unspecified injuries
Transient orclinically insignificant effects
BamesotlXe, MN10Jun81 300 5,000 1,225 30 - >17 >17 NOAEL:exposurewitoutinjury
Verdrigs,OK -10Jun19 12 72 29 Instant - - - Flora:vegtativediscoloration
- q r 4 b ,S jffi, .... , . ,X':, -
7May76 12 72 29~~W 24 lr: hatece >s;
Houston,TX 111 May76 2,000 2,300 2,145 Instant-- -
~~~~~~~~~m* 0 ..> ivg§S .. ... .
Pensacola, FL 9Nov77 2,300 ? - 240 - - -
~~~~~~21 Jan70 5.000 20,000 10,000 -9
includingchlorne
Fauna: birds fellfrom trees
..... ............. orcatie)
Fauna: deathofsmallbirds, wildlife
Fauna: death ofninehorses
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Abbreviations:?,unknown;NOAEL, noadverse effectlevel.
'Adapted from Markham Ifl. Note that some accidents are accorded muliple lisdngs. This is done to accommodate multiple exposure scenarios, such as mightprevail atdifferent
locations inthevicinityofthe accident
1.p. F...w ii :1.1 ... .1 'Itill. W.O.Y 09Mcon 0.51,11M.1.1
,r
m
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in contrast to multiple sources cited and
described above, and in each case found to be
questionable. Given the failure of the
deceased to seek immediate medical attention,
and his ability to continue working, this
report suggests that both the duration and the
degree ofthe cardiopulmonary stress to which
his death was attributed may have been signif-
icantly and unnecessarily exacerbated. As early
as 1927, Henderson and Haggard (317)
reported that ammonia-induced pulmonary
edema, if severe, usually terminates fatally,
but can be and should be treated:
inhalation ofoxygen tends to relieve the anoxemia
and cyanosis and should always be begun as early
as possible in the stage of gray cyanosis....By far
the most important feature of treatment in such
cases is absolute quiet and rest. Neglect of this
requirement is common and frequently precipi-
tates death by sudden heart failure.
Thus, the level of exposure to ammonia
experienced by the deceased might be surviv-
able for individuals comparably exposed, if
they receive appropriate medical attention
promptly.
Together, the facts educed from this inci-
dent suggest that a concentration ofairborne
ammonia to which brief exposure may be
nonlethal is significantly in excess of 10,000
ppm-v, and may be as high as 330,000 ppm-
v, at least for sporadic exposure. The victim
must have been exposed to 330,000 ppm-v,
at least sporadically, because he was located
next to the fill-hole of a tank while manually
pumping ammonia into it, thereby displacing
a large volume ofsaturated ammonia vapor at
330,000 ppm-v, and he lacked respiratory
protection. His face also was reddened by
ammonia.
Available data do not support 330,000
ppm-v as an accurate estimate of nonlethal
continuous exposure. However, inaccuracy is
intrinsic when deriving knowledge from an
accident reconstruction, whose success often
relies on the meta-analyses of multiple acci-
dents. In such meta-analysis, each accident
reconstruction is inaccurate, but if multiple
reconstructions are reasonably consistent, they
may converge on a particular potency value or
range of values. The consistency of multiple
accidents must be evaluated based on a mini-
mum-error exposure estimator for each acci-
dent. The arithmetic orgeometric mean ofthe
reported range of ammonia concentrations
may be the mathematically best available esti-
mator of discontinuous (on-off) exposure. A
reasonable use ofthe mean as an exposure esti-
mator in this case is to conservatively assume
that tank filling and measuring required only
5 min, and that the equivalent continuous
exposure level was equal to the mid point
(arithmetic mean) of the reported range
(170,000 ppm-v). A more cautious approach
would bee toasme that the ammonia
concentration was at the geometric mean
(57,446 ppm-v) rather than at the arithmetic
mean ofthe reportedconcentration range.
The Bartow accident. An accident
occurred on 5 December 1996 at an ammonia
plant in Bartow, Florida, in which a worker
drove a forklift under a storage tank of pres-
surized anhydrous ammonia (60). He severed
a downwardly protruding tank nipple, releas-
ing a strong flow of ammonia onto himself.
Table4. Evaluation of Potchefstroom, SouthAfrica, ammonia incidentto estimate human lethality concentrations.a
Time Modeled ammonia Estimated Conc Equivalent
from concentration range exposure Cumulative times mean conc (ppm)
release From To duration exposure duration averaged over
(sec) (ppm) (ppm) Mean (sec) (sec) (ppm/sec) 1 min 5 min
Column - a b c d e f g h
Formula---- (b+c)/2 a5=(a,5 - ao)/2 X:,e dx e g/60 g/300
Zone 1. < 50 m from release point
0 0
5 641,000 641,000 641,000
15 365,000 365,000 365,000
30 220,000 221,000 220,500
50 136,000 138,000 137,000
60 109,000 113,000 111,000
80 79,600 85,000 82,300
100 62,200 68,300 65,250
120 49,800 57,300 53,550
180 28,100 37,600 32,850
240 15,800 24,100 19,950
300 7,600 13,700 10,650
360 1,300 7,900 4,600
420 - 2,000 2,000
480 - - 251,093
540 - - 58,647
600 - _
660 - - -
720 - -
Zone 2: > 50 to < 100 m from release point
0
5
15
30
50
60
80
100
120
180
240
300
360
420
480
540
600
660
720
365,000
220,000
136,000
109,000
79,600
62,200
49,800
28,100
15,800
8,900
2,900
365,000
221,000
138,000
113,000
85,000
68,300
57,300
37,600
24,100
13,700
8,300
5,500
3,200
1,100
365,000
220,500
137,000
111,000
82,300
65,250
53,550
32,850
19,950
11,300
5,600
5,500
3,200
1,100
202,354
39,293
7.5
12.5
17.5
15
15
20
20
40
60
60
60
60
60
7.5
20
37.5
52.5
67.5
87.5
107.5
147.5
207.5
267.5
327.5
387.5
447.5
4,807,500
4,562,500
3,858,750
2,055,000
1,665,000
1,646,000
1,305,000
2,142,000
1,971,000
1,197,000
639,000
276,000
120,000
67.5 sec (1.125 min) time-weighted average
447.5 sec (7.458 min)time-weighted average
12.5
17.5
15
15
20
20
40
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
0
0
12.5
30
45
60
80
100
140
200
260
320
380
440
500
560
4,562,500
3,858,750
2,055,000
1,665,000
1,646,000
1,305,000
2,142,000
1,971,000
1,197,000
678,000
336,000
330,000
192,000
66,000
60 sec (1.00 min) time-weighted average
560 sec (9.333 min) time-weighted average
Zone 3: > 100 to < 200 m from release point
0 - _ _
5
15
30
50
60
80
100
120
180
240
300
360
420
480
540
600
660
720
136,000
109,000
79,600
62,200
49,800
28,100
15,800
9,100
5,400
1,900
138,000
113,000
85,000
68,300
57,300
37,600
24,100
13,700
8,300
5,600
4,000
2,400
80,125
76,042
64,313
34,250
27,750
27,433
21,750
35,700
32,850
19,950
10,650
4,600
2,000
76,042
64,313
34,250
27,750
27,433
21,750
35,700
32,850
19,950
11,300
5,600
5,500
3,200
1,100
34,250
27,750
27,433
21,750
35,700
32,850
19,950
11,400
6,850
3,750
4,000
2,400
0
0
0
0
137,000 15 15 2,055,000
111,000 15 30 1,665,000
82,300 20 50 1,646,000
65,250 20 70 1,305,000
53,550 40 110 2,142,000
32,850 60 170 1,971,000
19,950 60 230 1,197,000
11,400 60 290 684,000
6,850 60 350 411,000
3,750 60 410 225,000
4,000 60 470 240,000
2,400 60 530 144,000
80,118 70 sec (1.167 min) time-weighted average
25,821 530 sec (8.833 min) time-weighted average
16,025
15,208
12,863
6,850
5,550
5,487
4,350
7,140
6,570
3,990
2,130
920
400
15,208
12,863
6,850
5,550
5,487
4,350
7,140
6,570
3,990
2,260
1,120
1,100
640
220
6,850
5,550
5,487
4,350
7,140
6,570
3,990
2,280
1,370
750
800
480
(Continued)
Volume 107, Number 8, August 1999 . Environmental Health Perspectives 622Review * Emergency planning and toxicity of inhaled ammonia
The victim suffered cryogenic ammonia burns
to his skin and eyes, as well as lung injury
from inhalation of ammonia. However, he
was able to extricate himselffrom the vehide,
run to a telephone, and summon assistance.
Theincident released anestimated 142 tons of
ammonia over 2 hr. Although the victim was
hospitalized for 19 days, he survived andeven-
tually returned to work. Five gas dispersion
models defined isolines at ground level within
which ammonia levels reached > 900,000
ppm-v. Assuming validity of the Ten Berge
(33) equation with n = 2, this incident was
reported to indicate a 5-min survivable con-
centrationof89,400 ppm-v.
Miscellaneous accidents. Several acci-
dents in which ammonia concentrations
were inferred by such means are evaluated in
Table 3 to discern effect concentrations
implied by reported ranges of exposure.
Examination ofTable 3 reveals an absence of
reliable exposure duration data. Nonetheless,
the geometric mean ofreported lethal expo-
sure ranges is approximately 30,000 ppm. A
reasonably conservative exposure would
appear to be 5 min based on the amount of
time required for dissipation ofammonia, as
inferred from the ammonia release accident
in Potchefstroom. This accident is evaluated
inTables 4-6 and in supporting text.
The Potchefstroom accident. On 13
July 1973 an ammonia bullet tank in
Potchefstroom failed, releasing 38 metric
tons of anhydrous ammonia. The basis for
exposure concentrations in Table 3 was the
World Bank Hazard Analysis (WHAZAN;
Technica, London) air dispersion model.
Higher concentrations in Table 4 were based
on the more modern HGSYSTEM model
(Shell Research, Ltd., London) (53), which
better accounts for the initially heavier-than-
air density ofcryogenic (adiabatically cooled)
ammonia. WHAZAN modeling assumptions
used byPederson and Selig (6) in reconstruct-
ing the Potchefstroom accident were applied
as inputs to HGSYSTEM (53). Cold, rela-
tively high-density ammonia remains within
the breathing zone before equilibrating with
ambient outdoor temperature. Consequently,
with HGSYSTEM, fatality rates in accident
zones correlate with higher ammonia concen-
trations, and with lower acute toxic potency,
ofinhaledammonia.
As Table 4 indicates, the exposure dura-
tion in zone 1 was estimated at 448 sec (7.5
min). The time-weighted average exposure
over that duration was 58,647 ppm-v (Table
4), with 60% mortality (Table 6). Values for
other zones are as follows: zone 2, 9.3 min,
39,293 ppm-v, and 26% mortality; zone 3,
8.8 min, 25,821 ppm-v, and 83% mortality
(this value must be considered unreliable
because other exposed individuals are pre-
sumed to have left the scene uncounted);
and zone 4, 9.3 min, 18,073 ppm-v, and 0%
mortality (Tables 4 and 6).
A spectrum of predicted ammonia con-
centration-effect benchmarks is calculated in
Table 4 based on observed values, which are
also tabulated. Most notably, peak, 1-min,
and 5-min human inhalation LC50 and LCo
values are tabulated. These LC50 values are
Table 4. Continued.
Time Modeled ammonia Estimated Conc Equivalent
from concentration range exposure Cumulative times mean conc (ppm)
release From To duration exposure duration averaged over
(sec) (ppm) (ppm) Mean (sec) (sec) (ppm/sec) 1 min 5 min
Column - a b c d e f g h i
Formula-> - - (b+ c)/2 a5 = (a 5- a0)/2 Se dx e g/60 g1300
Zone 4: 250 m from release point
0 - - - - 0 - - -
5 - - - - 0 - - -
15 - - - - 0 - - -
30 - - - - 0 - - -
50 - - - - 0 - - -
60 - - - - 0 - - -
80 79,600 85,000 82,300 20 20 1,646,000 27,433 5,487
100 62,200 68,300 65,250 20 40 1,305,000 21,750 4,350
120 49,800 57,300 53,550 40 80 2,142,000 35,700 7,140
180 28,100 37,600 32,850 60 140 1,971,000 32,850 6,570
240 15,800 24,100 19,950 60 200 1,197,000 19,950 3,990
300 9,100 13,700 11,400 60 260 684,000 11,400 2,280
360 5,800 8,300 7,050 60 320 423,000 7,050 1,410
420 2,800 5,600 4,200 60 380 252,000 4,200 840
480 - 4,050 4,050 60 440 243,000 4,050 810
540 - 2,800 2,800 60 500 168,000 2,800 560
600 - 1,500 1,500 60 560 90,000 1,500 300
660 - - 63,663 80 sec (1.333 min)time-weighted average
720 - - 18,073 560 sec(9.333 min)time-weighted average
Conc, concentration.
'Based on data reported by Mudan and Mitchell(53).
560,000 ppm-v (peak), 268,832 ppm-v (1
min), and 83,322 ppm-v (5 min); LCo val-
ues are 82,300 ppm-v (peak), 84,883 ppm-v
(1 min), and 33,737 ppm-v (5 min).
Personal communications. To augment
the available database pertaining to ammo-
nia lethality concentrations, a series of tele-
phone inquiries was implemented. Target
contacts included representatives of insur-
ance companies that might have experi-
enced losses associated with anhydrous
ammonia release, chemical companies man-
ufacturing ammonia, trade associations
representing industries facing challenges of
handling ammonia, and federal agencies
regulating ammonia manufacture, transport,
and/or use. No data were found, and no
individual indicated that additional human
lethality data could be found.
Discussion and Conclusions
OdorThshold andVapor Density
The reported range of the ammonia odor
threshold (0.04-57 ppm-v) corresponds to the
range ofoccupational standards andguidelines
forprolonged exposure to ammonia. Theodor
threshold is also significantly below the
ammonia immediately dangerous to life and
health (IDLH) value [a National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
parameter] of 300 ppm-v. This value repre-
sents the concentration which, ifexceeded for
30 min, may render an exposed individual
incapable ofescape. Consequently, thedistinct
odor of ammonia and its relatively low odor
threshold constitute excellent warning proper-
ties. Individuals would be capable ofdetecting
ammonianearlysimultaneouslywith the onset
of exposure. In circumstances in which
ammoniamightgradually increase todinically
significant concentrations, the low odor
threshold may constitute an earlywarning sys-
tem, alerting exposed individuals of the need
to take corrective and/or protective actions.
The low odor threshold ofammonia may be
regarded as a risk-mitigating factor rather than
a risk-enhancing factor, as compared with
more-difficult-to-detect gases such as carbon
monoxide. Nonetheless, the excellent warning
properties of ammonia do not constitute a
substitute for its routine quantitative monitor-
ingatpotential release sites.
The finding that gaseous ammonia
exhibits a density of 0.6 relative to air indi-
cates that ammonia releases would tend to
rise in tranquil air. However, liquid ammonia
may be cryogenically cooled. Its initial densi-
ty upon release may be heavier than air (53).
Equilibration with outdoor ambient temper-
aturewould be expected to result in a gradual
transition to alighter-than-air condition.
Nonetheless, indoor settings may inhibit
effective ammonia dissipation, and both
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outdoor and indoor air might be sufficiently
turbulent to overcome the density-driven ten-
dency ofammonia to rise out ofthe personal
breathing zone of occupationally exposed
individuals. In contrast, environmentally
exposed individuals presumably would be
situated outdoors, where ammonia typically
would not be confined. The low vapor densi-
ty ofammonia relative to air may therefore be
regarded as a risk-mitigating factor rather
than a risk-enhancing factor as compared to a
heavier-than-air gas such as chlorine.
Relationship between Concentration
and Exposure Duration in
ProducingToxic Effect
An approximation in toxicology (sometimes
termed Haber's rule) is that the product of
the dose and duration ofexposure to a partic-
ular toxic substance equals a constant value
(6,33) according to the equation: C' (t) =
constant, where C is the concentration, t is
the exposure duration, and n is unity (= 1).
This rule is approximate forseveral reasons
(33), the explication ofwhich is beyond the
scope of this report. However, the rule often
maybe usefullyapplied to closelyspaced expo-
sure durations such as 5 min versus 1 hr.
Thus, a 5-min inhalation exposure to a partic-
ular concentration in air might be approxi-
matelyequivalent to a 1-hr exposure to 1/12th
ofthe 5-min concentration. Alternatively, Ten
Berge et al. (33) empiricallydetermined that n
= 2 formice and rats, andsuggest that nmight
= 2 for humans aswell. The relationship eluci-
dated above, with the value of n chosen from
1 to 2, may be used to adjust ammonia con-
centrations over varying exposure durations to
Table 5. Evaluation of the Potchefstroom, South
Africa, ammonia incidentto estimate human lethali-
ty concentrations: summary offatality rates.a
Ammonia level
Fatality 1 min
rate (%) Peak (ppm) 5 minb
Observed
o o 0 0
0 82,300 84,883 33,737
26 365,000 236,080 73,347
60 641,000 282,479 87,479
Calculatedc
0 82,300 84,883 33,737
10 191,341 143,036 48,972
20 300,383 201,188 64,207
30 398,000 241,539 75,010
40 479,000 255,185 79,166
50 560,000 268,832 83,322
60 641,000 282,479 87,479
70 722,000 296,126 91,635
80 803,000 309,773 95,791
90 884,000 323,420 99,947
100 965,000 337,067 104,103
'Based on data reported in Mudan and Mitchell (53).
bAdjusted from 7 or 9 min. clnterpolating or extrapolating
observed values.
the equivalent concentration corresponding to
anychosen exposure duration from 5 min to 1
hr (6). This report uses both extremes n - 1
and n = 2.
Adoption ofAcceptable Risk Criteria
Risk acceptability is a subjective judgment,
and cannot be defined scientifically.
However, qualitatively different adverse
health effects may be proposed as being
acceptable, and selection ofan acceptable risk
may be made from any ofa variety ofadverse
effects. These effects might range from no
adverse health effect, to clinically insignificant
effects, to reversible injury, to permanent
injury, or to lethality. Ammonia benchmarks
may be quantified based on holistic consider-
ation of toxicologic data, including human
clinical data, animal bioassay data, and reports
of industrial ammonia release accidents.
Selected acute toxicology benchmarks for
ammonia are summarized in Table 7. Ideally,
all data sources converge on a single value for
each toxicologic benchmark parameter to be
quantified. However, Table 7 reveals signifi-
cant disparity. One source ofsuch disparity is
revealed in "Results"; that is, a fundamental
conflict between contemporary accident
reconstruction results versus largely anecdotal
data derived from reports ofammonia poten-
cy dating back, in some cases, to the years
when ammonia competed with mustard gas,
chlorine, and other war gases whose primary
purpose was to kill enemy soldiers engaged in
trench warfare. Potency values reported for
lethality in that context have persisted in the
contemporary literature, as depicted in Figure
1. Multiple industrial accident reconstruc-
tions point to a lower potency of ammonia
than suggested by apparently anecdotal data,
and the lower potency suggested by the acci-
dent reconstruction data is consistent with
animal bioassays using multiple species.
Fatal Exposure Concentration
The National Research Council Committee
on Toxicology defines three levels ofcommu-
nity emergency exposure levels (CEELs, since
renamed AEGLs). AEGL-3 is defined to pro-
tect members of the general population,
Table 6. Evaluation of the Potchefstroom, South
Africa, ammonia incidentto estimate human lethali-
ty concentrations: summary byzone.a
Zone
1 2 3 4
Individuals 10 27 6 ?
exposed (no.)
Fatalities (no.) 6 7 5 0
Survivors (no.) 4 20 1 All
Fatality rate 0.60 0.26 0.83 0.00
Survival rate 0.40 0.74 0.17 1.00
?, unknown.
aBased on data reported in Mudan and Mitchell1531.
including susceptible but excluding hypersus-
ceptible individuals, against "death or life-
threatening effects..for example, pulmonary
edema, cardiac failure, or cancer" (1). The
benchmark for fatal exposure to ammonia
may be derived from American Industrial
Hygiene Association (AIHA) emergency
response planning guidelines (ERPGs), ani-
mal bioassay data, human data, and reports
of fatal accidents. These sources should pro-
duce consistent results but, in the case of
ammonia, they do not. They will be synthe-
sized to produce a conservative but realistic
estimate ofthe ammonia lethality concentra-
tion for short exposure durations.
AJIA ERPG-3. The AIHA (61) defines
ERPG-3 as
[t]he maximum airborne concentration below
which it is believed that nearly all individuals could
be exposed for up to one hour without experienc-
ing or developing life-threatening health effects.
The ERPG-3 value for ammonia is 1,000
ppm-v. According to the AIHA,
[t]his level may cause severe eye and nasal irritation
[19,20,62]; however, based on animal toxicology
data [63,641 lethality would not be expected.
The 1-hr 1,000-ppm-v ERPG-3 is equivalent
to a 5-min value of 12,000 ppm-v using
Haber's rule or 3,464 ppm-v using Ten
Berge's adjustmentwith n = 2. As indicated in
"Results" and inTable 2, highervalues are also
sublethal. Indeed, the AIHA's ERPG-3 value
is not based on lethality and therefore already
incorporates an unquantified safety factor.
The actual ammonia lethality level cannot be
reconstructed based on the AIHA's documen-
tation, and the ERPG-3 must be rejected as
downwardly adjusted and irrelevant.
Table 7. Ammonia acute inhalation toxicology
benchmarks.
Conc Duration
Benchmark (ppm-v) (min)
Odor threshold 0.04-57 > 0
Standards and guidelinesa
ACGIH STEL 35 15
AIHA ERPG-2 (injury/escape) 200 60
NIOSH IDLH 300 30
AIHA ERPG-3 (lethality) 1,000 60
Clinically insignificant effects 50 10
Irreversible effects 7,051 5
2,879 30
2,035 60
Fatal exposure > 33,737 5
> 5,623 30
Abbreviations: ACGIH, American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists; AIHA, American
Industrial Hygiene Association; Conc, concentration;
ERPGs, Emergency Response Planning Guidelines; IDLH,
immediately dangerous to life or health; NIOSH, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; STEL, short-
term exposure limit.
8National Library of Medicine 1131.
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Animalstudies. Numerous animal bioas-
say reports were addressed in "Results"
(Table 2). They were adjusted to equivalent
HECs using parameters for dose conversion
among species (7,8) and EPA methodology
(8). Although the LCLO parameter is more
conservative than the LC50 parameter, the
dearth ofLCLO values resulted in LC50 val-
ues that are lower than the LCLO values
(Table 2). Consequently, both parameters
will be considered together.
Concentrations of airborne ammonia
whose lethality to humans is estimated based
on animal bioassaystudies produced an arith-
metic mean inhalation LCLO or LC50 value
of 215,390 ppm-v at 5 min; 35,898 ppm-v
at 30 min; and 17,949 ppm-v at 60 min in
accordance with Haber's rule, or 70,508;
28,785; and 20,354 ppm-v, respectively,
using Ten Berge's adjustment with n = 2.
Geometric mean values were 108,478;
19,369; and 9,946 ppm-v according to
Haber's rule, and 34,455; 14,559; and
10,433 ppm-v using Ten Berge's adjustment.
The minimum human equivalent LCLO or
LC50 value was reported from guinea pig
data: 5,956 ppm-v at 5 min; 993 ppm-v at
30 min; and 496 ppm-v at 60 min according
to Haber's rule, and 5,956; 2,431; and 1,719
ppm-v using Ten Berge's adjustment. These
minimum values are outliers, however, and
are contradicted by other data on guinea pigs
(38): 35,957 ppm-v at 5 min; 14,679 at 30
min; 10,380 ppm-v at 60 min using Haber's
rule, and 8,040; 4,020; and 1,005 ppm-v
usingTen Berge'sadjustmentwith n = 2.
The upper respiratory systems of mam-
mals, including humans, may scrub ammo-
nia, especially during nose breathing. This
process affords some protection ofthe lower
respiratory system from injury. This protec-
tion, however, tends to be lost quickly at
high ammonia concentrations, which satu-
rate the scrubbing capacity ofupper respira-
tory structures. Some lethality values derived
from animal bioassays (ofrabbits, for exam-
ple) involved cannulation, and are highly
conservative. These values are conservative
because cannulation, usually at the wind-
pipe, bypasses the upper respiratory tract,
reducing the concentration ofammonia nec-
essary to cause toxic injury to the lower res-
piratory tract. Animal studies involving can-
nulation, therefore, tend to reduce ammonia
effect levels such as lethality. In contrast,
humans exposed to ammonia in accidental
releases are unlikely to have been cannulated,
and may scrub ammonia by reverting to
nose breathing, or even by breathing with
mouths coveredwith wet cloth.
Human data, apparently anecdotal.
Human lethality values derived from animal
data were significantly higher than lethality
values derived from apparently anecdotal
reports of lethality following human expo-
sure. The latterproduced an arithmetic mean
inhalation lethality value of95,000 ppm-v at
5 min; 15,833 ppm-v at 30 min; and 7,917
ppm-v at 60 min in accordance with Haber's
rule; or 20,000; 8,165; and 5,774 ppm-v,
respectively, using Ten Berge's adjustment
with n = 2. Geometric mean values were
39,482; 6,580; and 3,290 ppm-v according
to Haber's rule, and 16,119; 6,580; and
4,653 ppm-v using Ten Berge's adjustment.
Thus, a disparity exists between lethality data
derived from animal- versus human studies,
and this disparity is approximately 3-fold
when arithmetic mean lethality values are
considered (215,390 ppm-v/95,000 ppm-v =
2.3 at 5 min using Haber's rule; 70,508
ppm-v/20,000 ppm-v = 3.5 (also at 5) min
usingTen Berge's adjustment).
Accident reports. The toxicologic find-
ings discussed above and presented in Table
2 are quantitatively complex but qualitative-
ly simple: predictions of ammonia concen-
trations thatwould be lethal to humans tend
to be significantly lower than lethal concen-
trations inferred from animal studies. This is
true under Haber's rule [C" (t) = constant,
with n = 1] or Ten Berge's adjustment with
n = 2 (based on dataon mice and rats).
Considered alone, the human data are
questionable, as explained previously.
Considered in the context ofthe animal data,
the human data are further questionable: no
obvious basis is evident for the apparently
greater sensitivity of humans than animals.
This disparity between human lethality val-
ues inferred from human data versus animal
data motivated reconstruction of the 1973
industrial accident in Potchefstroom, which
killed 18 people, as described and tabulated
inTables 4-6 anddepicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of increas-
ing peak, 1 min, and 5-min time-weighted
average anhydrous ammonia concentrations
in air on the human fatality rate. The LC50
values are estimated to be a peak of560,000
ppm-v, a 1-min mean of 268,832 ppm-v,
and a 5-min mean of83,322 ppm-v. Longer
term values were not generated because the
air modeling addressed an exposure period
ofunder 10 min.
The Potchefstroom accident reconstruc-
tion indicates ammonia lethality levels signifi-
cantly higher than both the human data and
animal bioassay data. However, the accident
reconstruction is complicated because the
plant contained a control room and other
structures that were at least partially endosed.
These potential refuges would tend to elevate
the apparent resistance of individuals to
ammonia. Aconservative interpretation ofthe
accident reconstruction, therefore, is appro-
priate. For example, the 5-min concentration
producing 0% mortality (LCO) determined
from zone 4, where no fatalities occurred, was
33,737 ppm-v (Table 6). This value is consis-
tent with human lethality levels derived from
the animal bioassay data, but is still higher
than lethality levels inferred from the human
data. It is also consistentwith the Mulderand
Van der Zalm report (47), in which an indi-
vidual died, possibly unnecessarily, following
exposure to a sizable but unknown fraction of
330,000-ppm-v saturated ammonia vapor. A
reasonable inference from analysis ofavailable
accident data is that they validate adjustment
of animal lethality concentrations to human
equivalentvalues.
Irreversible Injury Concentration
AEGL-2 is defined by the National Research
Council Committee on Toxicology to pro-
tect members of the general population,
including susceptible but excluding hypersus-
ceptible individuals, against permanent or
long-lasting effects, impairment ofthe ability
to escape, or disablement; for example, as a
result of"severe eye or respiratory irritation,
disorientation, and organ damage" (1). The
IDLH and the ERPG-2 parameters are can-
didates for the irreversible injury (AEGL-2)
benchmark, but the values assigned these
parameters in the case of ammonia are
flawed. However, the IDLH or the ERPG-2
methodology might be adopted, rather than
the IDLH or ERPG-2 value for ammonia.
Appropriate use of these parameters is
addressedbelow.
AII4 ERPG-2. A reasonable candidate
value for the benchmark for irreversible
injury is 200 ppm-v, which corresponds to
the AIHA ERPG-2 value (65). The AIHA
(65) defines ERPG-2 as
[t]he maximum airborne concentration below
which it isbelieved that nearlyall individuals could
be exposed for up to one hour without experienc-
ing or developing irreversible or other serious
health effects or symptoms which could impair an
individual's ability to takeprotective action.
The ERPG-2 for ammonia is 200 ppm-v.
According to theAIHA (65),
[t]here is likely to be strong odor and some eye
irritation at this level [20,66,6X], but serious
health effects are unlikely. Rats continuously
exposed to 180 ppm for 90 days showed no
adverse effects [64], and humans repeatedly
exposed to 100 ppm for sixweeks developed only
slight eye irritation [661.
The ERPG-2 value does not represent an
irreversible injury level, but an eye irritation
level-and not the highest tolerable.
Silverman et al. (19) reported that all seven
individuals voluntarily exposed to ammonia
at 500 ppm-v for 30 min tolerated the expo-
sure without adverse effect or inability to
escape. Afundamental problem with ERPG-2
is that eye irritation and associated lacrimation
occur over a wide range of concentrations,
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with effects varying from annoyance to clin-
ical significance. Impairment of vision may
reduce escape ability, but escape ability is
reduced routinely by factors such as dark-
ness during industrial emergencies, either
because they may occur at night or because
power may be lost during daytime emergen-
cies in structures not illuminated internally
by sunlight.
NIOSH IDLH. Another reasonable
candidate value for the benchmark for
irreversible injury is 300 ppm-v for 30 min,
which corresponds to the NIOSH IDLH
value (68) (Table 7). Preference ofthis regu-
latory criterion over toxicologic data would
seem desirable, given the apparent unavail-
ability ofdetailed dose-response human tox-
icology data documenting irreversible injury
from ammonia inhalation. However, use of
the IDLH value is undesirable. The IDLH
value is based on secondary literature (68),
and NIOSH indicated that the primary liter-
ature was not examined. NIOSH investiga-
tors indicate that
[t]he chosen IDLH is based on the statement by
AIHA (1971) that 300 to 500 ppm for 30 to 60
minutes have been reported as a maximum short
exposure tolerance (Henderson and Haggard
1943).
However, AIHA (65) is superseded by
AIHA (61), which states that 300-500
ppm-v is a maximum 1-hr exposure, irritat-
ing the eyes, nose, and throat. The AIHA
(61) does not state that 300-500 ppm-v is
the maximum tolerable, nor that the time
frame over which its effects might become
intolerable is 30 min. The AIHA also does
not state that 300-500 ppm-v might render
an exposed individual incapable of escape
within 30 min. Indeed, the AIHA (61) fur-
ther states that 1,000 ppm-v represents
[t]he maximum airborne concentration below
which it is believed that nearly all individuals
could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experi-
encing or developing life-threatening health
effects....This level may cause severe eye and nasal
irritation; however, based on animal toxicology
data lethality would not be expected.
In supporting an IDLH value of 300
ppm-v, NIOSH (68) indicates that "AIHA
(1971) also reports that 5,000 to 10,000
ppm are reported to be fatal (Mulder and
Van der Zalm 1967)." However, Mulder
and Van der Zalm (47) do not say this.
Indeed, they cite the 5,000- to-10,000-
ppm-v lethality range, but primarily for the
purpose ofrefuting it. They indicate that the
deceased was exposed to many times 10,000
ppm-v, that he ignored instructions to report
to the infirmary for timely medical atten-
tion, and that he was able to resume work
for 3 hr despite his injuries.
NIOSH (68) also states that "exposures
for 30 min to 2,500 to 6,000 ppm are con-
sidered dangerous to life (Smyth 1956) [69]."
However, Smyth (69) is a secondary source
that compiled suggested "hygienic standards
for dailyinhalation" (emphasis added).
The NIOSH report fails to indicate how
the lethality values it cites might be related to
its selection ofan IDLH. However, one might
surmise that NIOSH regards these lethality
values as LC50values, which might be equated
to 10 times a preliminary IDLH value (70):
...LC values (after 'adjusting' if necessary to 30
rnin) were divided by a safety factor of 10 to
determine a 'preliminary' IDLH for comparison
purposes.
Thus, the presumed lethality values of
5,000-10,000 ppm-v would support IDLH
values of500-1,000 ppm-v, and 2,500-6,000
ppm-v would support an IDLH of 250-600
ppm-v. However, the lethality values cited by
NIOSH appear to be unreliable based on
analyses presented herein.
Potchefstroom accident reconstruction.
The irreversible injury concentration may
be derived in a manner consistent with
derivation ofthe IDLH value. The IDLH is
initially estimated as one-tenth the (animal)
LC50 value. Subsequent adjustment may be
necessary based on examination of other
types of data, such as explosivity limits and
the concentrations at which respiration is
reduced 50% in mice or rats exposed for 10
min. The mean 5-min LC50 value derived
earlier from animal bioassay data is 70,508
ppm-v using the Ten Berge adjustment,
which in this case is more conservative than
the Haber's rule value (215,390 ppm-v).
The 5-min LC50 value derived earlier from
the Potchefstroom accident reconstruction
is 83,322 ppm-v, but this may represent an
upper limit, as discussed previously. Using
the mean 5 min LC50 value from animal
bioassays produces an irreversible injury
concentration of 7,051 ppm-v at 5 min;
1,175 ppm-v at 30 min; and 588 ppm-v at
1 hr using Haber's rule; and 7,051; 2,879;
and 2,035 ppm-v, respectively, using Ten
Berge's adjustment with n = 2. These values
are approximately one-fifth the 5-min
lethality value of33,737 ppm-v.
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